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1  Introduction
In this chapter, I  investigate the role of economists in public discourses on 
wealth and inheritance taxation in the German press. I do so by drawing on the 
recent “cultural turns” in regulation theory and post-Marxist thinking, in dis-
cussing economists as organic intellectuals – a term coined by Antonio Gramsci 
to describe the class-related nature of thinkers – and their role in society. In 
particular, economists are perceived to either shape the political and economic 
agendas in favour of the capitalist classes (“hegemonic organic intellectuals”) or 
call into question current policy regimes that favour dominant accumulation 
regimes (“counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals”).
To that end, text-mining methods are used to identify economists in the 
newspaper articles on wealth and inheritance taxation in seven German print 
outlets between 2000 and 2018. Media economists – the subset of economists 
that is present in media debates – are investigated regarding their quantitative 
appearance in the different newspapers and over time, their paradigmatic ori-
entation as well as their political affinities.
This chapter shows that well-known economists frequently occur in the 
newspaper coverage, which is no surprise given their position as directors of 
influential research institutes or experts in this particular field of economic 
research. Over time, varying levels of occurrences are identified which can 
be partly explained by the publication of books on wealth taxation and the 
broader issue of economic inequality. Considering paradigmatic orientations, 
this chapter indicates a stark dominance of economists associated with main-
stream economics and ordoliberalism, who are closely associated to market-
liberal organisations. Much less frequently occurring are post-Keynesian 
economists and other heterodox economists with ties to social-democratic and 
left-winged organisations. This pattern is reinforced by the political orienta-
tion of the newspapers. Given the role of economists as organic intellectuals 
in the political economy, such results point to a continuing legitimation and 
normalisation of the structural power of the capital class to assert their interests 
regarding low wealth and inheritance taxation.
As said, the role of economists in public discourses is investigated drawing 
on the example of wealth and inheritance taxation in Germany. The German 
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case is an illustrative example, because wealth inequality is particularly strik-
ing in Germany, which is one of the most unequal countries in the Eurozone 
area in terms of the wealth distribution (Bach et al., 2018; Leitner, 2016). One 
major reason for the persistence of wealth inequality is the transfer of wealth 
over generations in the form of gifts and inheritances, which leads to about 25 
to 40 per cent of overall wealth in Germany being inherited (Fessler & Schürz, 
2018; Leitner, 2016). Simulations indicate that the overall value of bequests and 
gifts has increased sharply in recent years, reaching annual amounts of around 
200 to 300 billion euros per year, which is equivalent to about 10 per cent of 
national income (Bach & Thiemann, 2016).
Yet, the different forms of wealth taxation (net wealth taxes, taxation of 
income generated from wealth such as capital income or rents, or the taxation 
of inheritance) play a very limited role in the German tax system. In sum, the 
different forms of wealth taxation result in approximately 1 per cent of GDP 
since the mid-1990s (Bach, 2018, 2014).1 A major reason is the expiration of 
the wealth tax in 1997 and rather low levels of revenue generated from the 
inheritance taxation due to extensive tax exemptions on business assets and on 
transfers to family members (Theine, 2019; Scheve & Stasavage, 2012; Hou-
ben & Maiterth, 2011).2
From a (post-)Marxist perspective, specific state policies such as the design of 
the tax system are the terrain of political struggles and historical contestations 
between different classes, class fractions and groups in society.3 Taxes can tell 
much about the dominance of certain classes and class fractions as well as the 
influence of other social forces (Jessop, 2016). In this account, the minor role 
of wealth taxation vis-à-vis other forms of taxation (taxes on consumption and 
labour income) can be regarded as the result of structural power of the capital 
class that is able to assert their interests. And indeed, detailed investigations of 
interest group influence on wealth and inheritance taxation signify the inten-
sive lobbying by business and wealthy interest groups for continuing low level 
of inheritance and wealth taxation or even the abolishment thereof (Theine, 
2020; Butterwegge, 2018; Hartmann, 2018).
This contribution is structured in the following way: section 2 discusses the 
“cultural turns” in regulation theory and post-Marxist thinking with a particu-
lar focus on the role of economists as organic intellectuals, section 3 introduces 
the methodological considerations of the empirical investigation, section 4 pre-
sents the main results and section 5 concludes.
2  The regulation approach, its cultural turns and 
economists as organic intellectuals
This chapter is situated in the recent ‘cultural turns’ in regulation theory and 
post-Marxist thinking that highlight the role of linguistic and semiotic ele-
ments, discourses and language in capitalist trajectories at large and the regu-
lation of specific accumulation regimes more specifically (e.g. Angermuller, 
2018; Jessop  & Sum, 2018; Maesse, 2018; Sum  & Jessop, 2013). A  prime 
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example of taking cultural turns seriously is the post-disciplinary approach 
“cultural political economy” (CPE) mainly developed by Sum and Jessop 
(2013). They emphasise the foundational nature of semiosis (any process of 
sense- and meaning-making) in social relations. Semiotic features play a fun-
damental role in interpreting and understanding actual events and processes as 
well as in reducing their complexity. At the same time, CPE remains rooted in 
the regulation approach as it emphasises the embeddedness of semiotic features 
in the broader sets of capitalist social relations.
Moving from rather general remarks to more specific investigations of eco-
nomic practices, and in particular, of economic policies, Jessop (2010) high-
lights the role of discursively selective economic “imaginaries” that, vis-à-vis 
structurally selective institutions, frame individual subjects’ lived experience of 
the inordinately complex world. In stabilising and prioritising some economic 
activities, they justify certain social positions over others, and, by and by, nor-
malise the legitimacy of some economic activities from a broad set of possible 
activities while at the same time disqualifying other (alternative) activities (Jes-
sop, 2010). Economic imaginaries are selectively defined due to the discursive 
and material biases of specific economic paradigms.
Among the main forces involved in the (re)definition and articulation of 
specific economic imaginaries at the micro-, meso- or macro-level are various 
actors in the civil society such as think tanks, intellectuals, international bod-
ies, organised interests and social movements. Furthermore, the mass media are 
also crucial intermediaries in mobilising elite and/or popular support behind 
competing imaginaries (Jessop, 2010).
In this chapter, I focus on the role of economists who, due to their expert 
status, play a key role in defining, articulating and normalising specific eco-
nomic imaginaries. It is Antonio Gramsci (1971/2003) who was among the 
first concerned with the role of intellectuals from a Marxist perspective. For 
him, intellectuals play a decisive role in the political economy as they have the 
time, material resources and outstanding public standing which enable them to 
shape and influence public debates on contested issues and to define the valid-
ity of diverse knowledge claims.4 In particular, he coined the term “organic 
intellectual” to stress that even though intellectuals typically perceive them-
selves as neutral and autonomous from class-based interests, they actually are 
not. In contrast, for Gramsci organic intellectuals are closely connected to dif-
ferent social classes as they promote and consolidate a specific conception of 
the world that provides awareness and (internal) coherence of classes in their 
economic, political and social fields. Thus, by promoting and consolidating 
specific conceptions of the world, they play an active part in privileging certain 
class positions and their interests over others.
O’Neill and Wayne (2018) go on to subdivide organic intellectuals into 
hegemonic organic intellectuals and counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals. 
Hegemonic organic intellectuals work on behalf of the capitalist class to help 
shape the broader political moral, social and cultural agenda and, thus, act as 
“the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social 
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hegemony and political government” (Gramsci, 1971/2003, p. 118). In con-
trast, counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals call into question the dominant 
frames of reference, assumptions and policy trends that favour specific accumu-
lation regimes and capitalism more generally (O’Neill & Wayne, 2018).
Specifying the different roles of economists, Maesse (2015, 2017) suggests 
that they often act as authoritative and legitimising actors in societal discourse 
due to the prestige inscribed in their academic positions and their educational 
credentials. Economists and knowledge from economics has a distinct status as 
a cultural resource for discursive interventions in the political and economic 
realm and in public debates.5
In the context of media debates, the so-called media economists (the sub-
set of economists that is present in such debates) typically use a specific set 
of discursive strategies, but are at the same time required to “convert” their 
specialised knowledge into more accessible language. Media statements need 
to be grounded in scientific expertise, otherwise media economists risk their 
reputation within the academic community, on which their prestige actually 
depends. It is crucial to note that media statements from economists trigger 
debate and dissent by fellow scientists, for instance, by calling into question the 
specific argument or invoking alternative empirical studies. Yet, the scientific 
standing of fellow economists with a similar paradigmatic orientation (see later) 
is typically not questioned, which leads Maesse (2017) to argue that, in such a 
case, media statements by economists unfold their actual efficacy.6
Finally, economists tend to hide or even deny their political affinity and 
ideological convictions in public discourse and portray themselves as “the voice 
of science,” i.e. they only convey subject-related facts and no personal positions 
(Maesse, 2015; Dow, 2015). Yet, all social science (thus, economic) theorising 
inevitably incorporates values and ideologies at various stages of research: be 
it on the level of theory selection and ontological assumptions, the empirical 
case selection or the specific methods used (Heise, 2019; Dow, 2015; Harvey, 
2015; Stretton, 1969). Above that, research has been documenting the affili-
ation of many economists to political parties, think tanks and organisations, 
which actively pursue political projects of various kinds (e.g. Salas-Porras, 
2018; Schmidt-Wellenburg, 2018; Pühringer, 2017; Plehwe & Walpen, 2006). 
For instance, Ötsch et al. (2018) show for the case of Germany that there is a 
long-standing practice of economists being active in the socio-political realm 
in various ways: as members of political parties, think tanks and foundations 
or by offering economic advice in expert committees, councils and regulatory 
bodies.
In summary, it can be drawn from this literature that media economists play 
an important role as organic intellectuals in media debates to justify and nor-
malise the legitimacy of some economic activities from a broad set of possi-
ble activities and, thereby, to defend certain social positions over others. This 
chapter considers media economists in the debate over wealth and inheritance 
taxation with a specific focus on their role as (counter) hegemonic organic 
intellectuals. It does so by making the ideological convictions and political 
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affiliations of economists explicit, thereby dismantling the myth of value- and 
position-free economics.
3  Methodology
In order to analyse the role of (media) economists in the media debates on 
wealth and inheritance taxation, this study employs text-mining methods in 
the framework of critical discourse studies (Subtirelu & Baker, 2017; Mautner, 
1995). This section explains and discusses the data collected for and used in this 
study and the text-mining methods.
The corpus of print media articles between 2000 and 2018 contains seven 
daily and weekly newspapers (see Table  11.1 for details). The newspapers 
were selected because they are considered to be the most influential and most 
read quality newspapers in Germany; several of them being listed as Leitme-
dium (“newspaper of record”), which fuel and influence social, political and 
economic debates on current affairs (Röper, 2018, 2014, 2008, 2004, 2000; 
Presserelations, 2017; Pfanner, 2011; Weischenberg et al., 2005).7
Concerning ownership, several newspapers belong to the ten largest media 
corporations in Germany. Among them are well-known multi-generational 
family businesses (Gruner+Jahr, Verlagsgruppe von Holtzbrinck and Axel 
Springer SE), where not only the ownership of the corporation but also con-
siderable wealth is passed on from one generation to another (see Ferschli et al., 
2019, for details). This ownership might imply that the aforementioned corpo-
rations have a vested interest in hostile media coverage of wealth and inherit-
ance taxation. Two newspapers have a distinctly different legal structure: taz 
Table 11.1 Number of articles per newspaper
Newspaper Type of newspaper Ownership No. of Share of total 
articles articles (in %)
Welt am Sonntag Weekly Axel Springer SE 703 7
Die Zeit Weekly, Verlagsgruppe von Holtzbrinck 644 7
Leitmedium
Der Spiegel Weekly, Gruner+Jahr, Spiegel- 431 4
Mitarbeiter KG, Rudolf 
Augstein heirs
Die Welt Daily Axel Springer SE 2332 24
Frankfurter Allg. Daily, Fazit-foundation 1077 11
Zeitung Leitmedium
Süddeutsche Daily, Südwestdeutsche Medien 2944 30
Zeitung Leitmedium Holding
taz Daily tageszeitung 1580 16
Verlagsgenossenschaft eG
Total 9711 100
Sources: Newspaper ownership is based on Ferschli et  al. (2019), kek (2019), Bergmann and Novy 
(2012), and Groll (2012).
Economists in public discourses 193
and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung belong to a cooperative and a non-profit 
foundation (Bergmann & Novy, 2012; Groll, 2012).
The editorial stance of the seven newspapers is for sure not clear cut and 
might have also evolved over time, yet past literature has identified certain ten-
dencies. Welt am Sonntag and Die Welt are rather bourgeois-conservative outlets 
with a distinctively market liberal stance towards economic policy issues (Sasse, 
2012; Pointner, 2010). Die Zeit enjoys a high reputation as a weekly newspa-
per with high-quality journalism. Its political and economic orientation falls 
mainly between the centre and left-liberal positions. Der Spiegel used to be an 
outspokenly liberal newspaper, yet gradually leaned towards more conserva-
tive positions, which was largely influenced by Stefan Aust, the editor-in-chief 
from 1994 to 2008 (Wolter, 2016; Burkhardt, 2012). Founded by a group of 
influential German industrials, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s tone since 
its early years oscillates between liberal and conservative positions (Burkhardt, 
2012). Current research endorses this long-standing impression that FAZ is 
rather neoliberal in framing as particularly staff journalists are advocating mini-
mal state intervention and market liberalism (Wolter, 2016; Pointner, 2010; 
Volkmann, 2006). Süddeutsche Zeitung is leaning towards a left-liberal orienta-
tion, although media scholars like Wolter (2016) show for the topic of current 
economic affairs in 1982 and 2003 that most articles were following neoliberal 
arguments and assessments. taz, founded as a self-organised, direct democratic 
newspaper, takes a rather left-wing, green-alternative stance (Groll, 2012).
The newspaper articles for the final corpus were obtained from several data-
bases (Lexis Nexis, factiva, and WISO) using appropriate keywords8 and with 
kind support from Alexander Leipold (forthcoming). After deleting unsuit-
able articles from the sample,9 the final corpus consisted of 9711 articles (see 
Table 11.1). Apart from the articles’ headlines, lead paragraphs and main con-
tent, the corpus entails information on the authors, publication date and length 
of the articles.
In order to analyse media economists as organic intellectuals, a comprehen-
sive list was compiled. The initial data was provided by Stephan Pühringer and 
consisted of all economists holding a professorship at a university in Germany 
in the 21st century (see Grimm et al., 2018 for details). In order to obtain a 
larger sample of economists beyond economic professors, this data was updated 
and extended from various sources: member lists of various academic associa-
tions in Germany (such as Keynes Gesellschaft and Verein für Socialpolitik), 
economists who are listed in rankings by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2018, 
2015, 2013) and Handelsblatt (2010), as well as a comprehensive list of German 
economists active on Twitter compiled by Makronom (Odendahl & Stachelsky, 
2019). Finally, well-known international economists were added to the sample 
based on their own previous research. In total, this resulted in a list of 1422 
economists.
As noted earlier, economists tend to make no reference to their ideological 
convictions, yet, at the same time, they are building their arguments on moral 
beliefs and political opinions – in particular when it comes to public debates on 
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socio-political matters (Dow, 2015; Harvey, 2015). To capture this aspect, this 
chapter builds on from previous research which regards economics being com-
prised of different schools of thought or paradigms (for details see Dobusch & 
Kapeller, 2012; Lee, 2012; Dequech, 2007). More specifically, economics can 
be differentiated between schools of thought being part of the mainstream, 
which is made up of the “neoclassical economics” as the dominant core theory 
with its central assumptions of rationality, ergodicity and equilibrium states as 
well as characterised by the exclusive acceptance of mathematical-deductive 
models and positivism as scientific rationales (Heise & Thieme, 2016; Lawson, 
2013; Dobusch & Kapeller, 2012; Dequech, 2007). At the same time, several 
economic schools of thought deviate partly from some of the core neoclassi-
cal assumptions but tend to remain in the scientific rationales of mainstream 
economics (mathematical-deductive models and positivism) – what Colander 
et  al. (2004) call the “edge of the mainstream” (see also Heise  & Thieme, 
2016; Dequech, 2007). Furthermore, “ordoliberalism” is a specifically German 
school of thought based around the central tenet of a competitive, market-
based society which is ensured by the policy of order (“Ordnungspolitik”) of 
the state (Frey et al., 2010; Ptak, 2009).
Heterodox economic approaches, on the other hand, reject the central 
axioms of neoclassical economics and are characterised by a methodological 
openness to less formally mathematical methods of scientific inquiry (Heise & 
Thieme, 2016). Furthermore, heterodox economic approaches aim at explain-
ing economics as a social provisioning process, which, according to Lee (2012, 
p.  340), directs the attention of economic analysis towards “human agency 
embedded in a cultural context and social processes in historical time affecting 
resources, consumption patterns, production and reproduction, and the mean-
ing (or ideology) of market, state and non-market/state activities engaged in 
social provisioning.” In Germany, heterodox economic approaches play a fairly 
small role. Given this, post-Keynesian economics is the most frequent hetero-
dox school of thought in Germany (Heise & Thieme, 2016; Frey et al., 2010).
Reflecting this state of affairs in economics, economists are classified as the 
following according to the paradigmatic orientations: ordoliberal economists, 
plural mainstream economists and other mainstream economists as the three 
variations of mainstream economics, as well as post-Keynesians and other het-
erodox economists as the two variations of heterodox economics. This cat-
egorisation was derived from previous research and is based on professional 
websites and publicly available CVs of the economists in question (Grimm 
et al., 2018; Ötsch et al., 2018; Heise et al., 2016; Heise & Thieme, 2016).
The conjunction between paradigmatic orientations and stance towards 
wealth and inheritance taxation is quite straightforward for the most part. Ordo-
liberal and other mainstream economists tend to be rather hostile towards the 
reintroduction of wealth taxation and/or a more progressive approach towards 
inheritance taxation. In terms of political affinities, recent research (Botzem & 
Hesselmann, 2018; Ötsch et al., 2018; Pühringer, 2017) is able trace close con-
nections of both group of economists to the network of German neoliberalism 
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(e.g. the Kronberger Kreis, Stiftung Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft or the 
Hayek Gesellschaft) – all of them being highly critical of higher taxation of 
inheritance and wealth (Lobbypedia, 2019a, 2019b; Ptak, 2007). Based on the 
aforementioned terminology, ordoliberal and other mainstream economists can 
be regarded as hegemonic organic intellectuals shaping the political and eco-
nomic agenda in favour of the capitalist class.
In contrast, many of the post-Keynesian and other heterodox economists 
tend to be in favour of higher inheritance taxation and/or a reintroduction 
of wealth taxation. In terms of political affinities, post-Keynesian economists 
are closely linked to the Böckler Stiftung or the Keynes Gesellschaft, both 
part of the “Keynesian-alternative thought collective” (Pühringer, 2017, p. 19). 
Hence, post-Keynesian and other heterodox economists can be considered 
counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals as they call into question current pol-
icy regimes that favour dominant accumulation regimes.
The plural mainstream economists are a rather heterogeneous group when 
it comes to their stance towards wealth and inheritance taxation. To be sure, 
economists such as Thomas Piketty or Paul Krugman have been arguing for 
a higher taxation of wealth, yet, for others in this group, the position is rather 
unclear.
4  Results
This section discusses the role of economists in newspaper coverage on wealth 
and inheritance taxation. It does so by assessing the quantitative appearance of 
economists in the different newspapers and over time. Then, it focuses on the 
paradigmatic orientations and political affinities of the economists in order to 
discuss their role as organic intellectuals in the political economy.
Regarding the quantitative appearance of economists, Table  11.2 displays 
the 30 most frequently mentioned economists in the newspaper coverage – all 
male. At first glance, it shows that Thomas Piketty is the most cited economist 
over the whole period. Likewise, several other international experts are among 
the 20 most mentioned economists, such as Joseph E. Stiglitz, Paul Krugman 
and Kenneth Rogoff. Moreover, several well-known German economists show 
up in the list. Among them are, for instance, Clemens Fuest – president of the 
Ifo Institute for Economic Research since 2016, as well as his long-standing 
predecessor Hans-Werner Sinn. Several current and former members of the 
German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung 
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung) are on the list, such as Peter Bofin-
ger, Lars Feld, Wolfgang Franz and Christoph M. Schmidt. In total, the list of 
economists cited in the newspaper coverage on wealth and inheritance taxation 
comprises 226 names, most of them mentioned only once or twice.
This result is well in line with previous research that also identified many 
of the economists listed here as important sources in media debates on eco-
nomic issues; thus, as media economists. For instance, Clemens Fuest, Hans-
Werner Sinn, Michael Hüther and Marcel Fratzscher who are high up on the 
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Table 11.2 30 most frequently mentioned economists
Name Welt am Die Welt Frankfurter Die Zeit DER Süddeutsche taz sum
Sonntag Allg. Zeitung SPIEGEL Zeitung
Thomas Piketty 6 5 16 14 7 21 14 83
Bert Rürup 4 10 6 6 10 12 1 49
Clemens Fuest 5 8 11 8 3 7 1 43
Hans-Werner Sinn 3 8 8 4 5 11 3 42
Stefan Bach 1 4 5 2 0 16 13 41
Peter Bofinger 2 4 3 4 4 9 8 34
Rudolf Hickel 1 0 4 0 2 7 15 29
Michael Hüther 6 11 5 1 0 4 0 27
Marcel Fratzscher 2 4 4 4 1 4 5 24
Joseph E. Stiglitz 1 2 2 3 2 6 6 22
Markus Grabka 1 3 2 2 3 5 6 22
Paul Krugman 1 0 2 6 3 7 3 22
Lars Feld 2 3 5 2 1 4 1 18
Thomas 5 4 0 2 1 3 1 16
Straubhaar
Gert Wagner 1 3 3 1 0 5 2 15
Christoph 2 1 2 2 0 3 4 14
Schmidt
Friedrich 1 2 2 2 0 7 0 14
Heinemann
Gustav Horn 1 2 1 5 0 3 2 14
Klaus 3 3 2 2 0 1 3 14
Zimmermann
Bernd Lucke 2 1 2 5 1 1 1 13
Dierk Hirschel 0 0 0 3 0 4 6 13
Kenneth Rogoff 0 3 2 1 3 3 1 13
Wolfgang Franz 1 4 1 0 0 5 2 13
Stefan Homburg 2 2 4 0 1 2 0 11
Wolfgang Wiegard 0 3 0 2 1 3 1 10
Achim Truger 0 0 3 2 0 1 3 9
Lawrence 0 0 1 5 2 0 1 9
Summers
Giacomo Corneo 1 0 3 0 3 1 0 8
Ben Bernanke 1 3 0 1 0 2 0 7
other 28 56 77 55 36 100 47 399
SUM 83 149 176 144 89 280 150 1071
list (Table 11.2) also play a dominant role in the media debates on the financial 
crisis and are in a leading position in the FAZ ranking of the most influential 
economists (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2018, 2015; Pühringer & Hirte, 
2015). Yet there are also striking differences. Most notably, Stefan Bach, econ-
omist at the DIW, is the fifth most cited economist in the coverage on wealth 
and inheritance taxation, but not listed in the FAZ rankings. In a similar vein, 
Andreas Hoffmann and Markus Grabka are typically also not that high up on 
the lists.
Table 11.2 also signifies important differences among the newspapers. Note 
that the quantitative occurrences of the economists in the different newspaper 
outlets need to be considered against the background of the number of articles 
in such newspapers (see Table 11.1). Taking the varying number of newspaper 
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articles into account, a striking pattern emerges that corresponds to political 
orientation of the newspapers. For instance, Die Welt and Welt am Sonntag, 
which are typically regarded as conservative and market-liberal newspapers (see 
section 3), refer frequently to Clemens Fuest, Hans-Werner Sinn and Michael 
Hüther, all of them rather market-liberal, conservative economists. In con-
trast, more progressive or even explicitly left-wing economists are less likely 
to be referred to: Die Welt is not citing Paul Krugman or Rudolf Hickel at 
all. Likewise, Welt am Sonntag rather infrequently refers to those economists. 
taz – a rather progressive newspaper outlet, on the other hand, refers to econo-
mists such as Dierk Hirschel, Christoph Butterwegge and Rudolf Hickel (all 
rather progressive) relatively more than to market-liberal ones, such as Michael 
Hüther, Clemens Fuest and Stefan Homburg.
Finally, Table  11.2 (last row) indicates that the reference to economic 
experts is not equally distributed among the seven newspapers (here again, one 
needs to take the varying number of articles per newspaper into account; see 
Table 11.1). Doing so, Die Zeit, Der Spiegel and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
refer to economists more frequently, in comparison to Die Welt, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung and taz.
Considering the appearance of economists over time, Figure  11.1 shows 
varying levels of occurrences over the years. At the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, but also at the end of the period of investigation, there is a scarce appear-
ance of economists in the different newspapers. In contrast, a few years stand 
out: 2005, 2012–2014 and 2016. A possible explanation for the peak in the 
latter two years (2014 and 2016) is the publication of the books Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century (2014) by Thomas Piketty and Verteilungskampf (2016) by 
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Figure 11.1 Occurrence of economists over time
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issue of wealth and inheritance taxation (see Grisold & Theine, forthcoming; 
Theine & Rieder, 2019a, 2019b for in-depth analysis of the newspaper debate 
after the publication of Piketty’s book).
I now turn to the paradigmatic orientation of the economists (see section 3 
for details on the methodology). Table 11.3 shows that economists associated 
with mainstream economics are by far the largest group in the newspaper cov-
erage, followed by pluralist mainstream economists and ordoliberalists. Much 
less frequently occurring are post-Keynesian economists and other heterodox 
economists. A closer look into the categories reveals that many of the most-
cited pluralist mainstream economists are in fact Thomas Piketty and his col-
leagues and co-authors (for instance Emanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman). 
When only German and German-based economists are considered, ordoliber-
alists make up a large majority of economists in the media coverage.
Here again, Table 11.3 indicates varying extents to which economists are 
mentioned in the seven newspapers. Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung and Welt am Sonntag mention mainstream and ordoliberal economists 
the most. In contrast, both groups of economists are least picked up by taz 
and Süddeutsche Zeitung. Plural mainstream economists are mentioned most 
frequently in Die Zeit, Der Spiegel and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In con-
trast, Die Welt and Welt am Sonntag almost make no reference at all to plural 
mainstream economists. Turning to post-Keynesian economists, they are most 
frequently mentioned in Die Zeit and taz. The other newspaper outlets only 
seldom refer to post-Keynesian economists; in particular, Die Welt and Welt am 
Sonntag make almost no reference at all. Heterodox economists, finally, are – if 
at all – mentioned by Der Spiegel and taz.
In order to consider political affinities, I now draw on several examples of 
conjunctions between media economists active in the debate on wealth and 
inheritance taxation and political organisations. Regarding ordoliberal and 
mainstream economists, several of the frequently occurring media economists 
are well connected to market-liberal organisations. For instance, Clemens 
Table 11.3  Number of economists occurring in newspaper articles according to paradig-
matic orientation
Paradigmatic orientation Welt am Die Frankfurter Die DER Süddeutsche taz sum
Sonntag Welt Allg. Zeitung Zeit SPIEGEL Zeitung
Mainstream 34 59 53 48 35 78 30 337
Economists
Plural Mainstream 12 16 42 38 22 99 47 276
Econ.
Ordoliberal 23 48 60 31 15 42 7 226
Economists
Postkeynesian 3 8 11 16 4 20 32 94
Economists
Heterodox Economists 2 3 6 2 7 12 24 56
NA 9 15 4 9 6 29 10 82
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Fuest and Lars Feld, both strong advocates of low wealth taxation, are part of 
the Kronberger Kreis, the academic advisory council of the Market Economy 
Foundation (Stiftung Marktwirtschaft). The foundation strives for a “renais-
sance of market oriented policies” which is led by the conviction that “the 
market offers more freedom and prosperity to society than can statism and 
government intervention” (Market Economy Foundation 2019). Regarding 
wealth and inheritance taxation, the foundation opposes a reintroduction of 
wealth taxation and is rather sceptical when comes to a progressive reform of 
the inheritance taxation (Lobbypedia, 2019c; Kronberger Kreis, 2015; Bült-
mann, 2013).
In a similar vein, Michael Hüther, just like Clemens Fuest and Lars Feld, 
are academic advisors to the Economic Council of the Christian Democratic 
Union (Wirtschaftsrat der CDU e.V.) (Lobbypedia, 2019d; Wirtschaftsrat der 
CDU, 2019). The council advocates for economic policies that “best reflect 
the principles of a social market economy” and represents the interests of 
small and medium-sized firms as well as multinational companies in Germany 
(Wirtschaftsrat der CDU, 2019). The council is highly critical of wealth and 
inheritance taxation as both supposedly jeopardise the innovation capacity and 
equity basis of German companies (Wirtschaftsrat der CDU, 2018).
As said, post-Keynesian and heterodox economists are less frequently occur-
ring in comparison to ordoliberal and other mainstream economists. For three 
post-Keynesian and heterodox media economists, Rudolf Hickel, Gustav 
Horn and Peter Bofinger, political affinities to social-democratic and left-wing 
organisations can be found. For instance, all three have signed an open letter 
against the German debt brake and tax cuts in 2009 which were issued by the 
Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) linked to the German Confederation 
of Trade Unions (DGB) (Bofinger & Horn, 2009; for details on the debate of 
the German debt brake see Pühringer, 2014).
Likewise, Rudolf Hickel and Gustav Horn are academic advisors to the 
Arbeitskreis Steuermythen  – a working group with close ties to the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) that aims to dismantle “misperceptions and myths” 
in the German debate over taxation and public finances (Arbeitskreis Steuer-
mythen, 2019). Gustav Horn, finally, was the academic director of the IMK 
from 2005 until 2019 and has been recently elected as a member of the board 
of the SPD (Horn, 2019; Social Democratic Party, 2019).
Recalling the aforementioned discussion of economists as organic intel-
lectuals, the imbalance between ordoliberal and other mainstream economists 
(hegemonic organic intellectuals) on the one hand, and post-Keynesian and 
other heterodox economists (counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals) on the 
other hand, signifies a dominance of market liberal positions over intervention-
ist agendas.
5  Conclusion
This chapter investigates the role of economists as organic intellectuals in public 
discourses drawing on the example of wealth and inheritance taxation in the 
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German press. In particular, economists are conceptualised to either shape the 
political and economic agendas in favour of the capitalist classes (“hegemonic 
organic intellectuals”) or call into question current policy regimes that favour 
dominant accumulation regimes (“counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals”).
Regarding their quantitative appearance, this chapter shows that well-known 
economists frequently occur in newspaper coverage, which is no surprise given 
their position as directors of influential research institutes or experts in this par-
ticular field of economic research. Over time, varying levels of occurrences are 
detected which can be partly explained by the publication of books on wealth 
taxation and the broader issue of economic inequality.
Considering paradigmatic orientations and political affinities of economists, 
this chapter indicates a stark dominance of economists associated with main-
stream economics and ordoliberalism who are closely connected to market-
liberal organisations. Much less frequently occurring are post-Keynesian 
economists and other heterodox economists linked to social-democratic and 
left-wing organisations. Given the role of economists as organic intellectuals 
in the political economy, the imbalance between hegemonic organic intellec-
tuals (ordoliberal and other mainstream economists) and counter-hegemonic 
organic intellectuals (post-Keynesian and other heterodox economists) points 
to a continuing legitimation and normalisation of the structural power of the 
capital classes to assert their interests regarding low wealth and inheritance 
taxation.
Notes
 1 Note that wealth taxation used to play a more substantial role in the overall state revenue. 
Just after the Second World War, taxes on the different forms of wealth taxation have been 
much higher with around 3 per cent of GDP. Even further in the past, taxes on wealth 
have been above 5 per cent of GDP in the Weimarer Republic (Bach, 2018). Seelkopf 
et  al. (2019) suggest that inheritance taxation is one of the early forms of taxation in 
Germany established on the national level in 1906, but with antecedents on the regional 
level in various parts of Germany dating back to the 17th century in the city of Hamburg 
and the principality of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Yet, since the 1990s, taxation of wealth has 
been reduced substantially.
 2 The inheritance taxation could have been strengthened quite “easily” in the 21st century, 
as it was subject to two constitutional court rulings in 2006 and 2014 which required a 
reform of the existing tax law. In both incidents, the legislature was given around two 
years to reform the tax act (see Theine, 2019, table A.1, for details). The subsequent tax 
reforms showed little to no progress regarding a higher taxation of inheritances. In con-
trast, several scholars have suggested new exemptions were being introduced into the law, 
decreasing the taxation of inheritance even further (see for instance Butterwegge, 2018; 
Horn et al., 2017; Bach, 2016).
 3 Poulantzas (1978), for instance, argues that the state is a complex “relationship of forces, 
or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class 
fractions” (cited in Jessop, 2019, p. 5); hence, it is an explanandum, not an explanatory 
principle (Jessop, 2016).
 4 To be more precise, for Gramsci everyone engages in intellectual reasoning to certain 
degrees, as people usually have a specific conception of the world – a “worldview” – 
which they have forged out of their experience, circumstance and through (mediated) 
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communication. But, “not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 
1971/2003, p. 9). This function of being an intellectual is reserved only for a specific 
group.
 5 Maesse (2015) actually suggests that economists not only talk about “economic issues” but 
that their public interventions stretch far into general political and societal questions. In 
this sense, they present themselves as “universal intellectuals” in a society that is affected 
more and more by economic globalisation and the structuring of social and political issues 
along economic rationales.
 6 The appointment of Achim Truger as a member of the German Council of Economic 
Experts may serve as an illustrative example of critique against economists with diverging 
paradigmatic orientations. The appointment of Truger, a post-Keynesian economist, by 
the German trade unions has been heavily criticised in the German media and, among 
others, by economists with a mainstream economic background. In particular, he was 
criticised for his perceived lack of scientific standing; his expert status as an economist was 
called into question (see for an overview: Oxi Redaktion, 2018; D’Ippoliti & Flechner, 
2018).
 7 Due to database restrictions, Bild Zeitung is unfortunately not part of the sample.
 8 The keywords used to identify the relevant newspaper articles for this study were wealth 
taxation and inheritance taxation (and variations thereof in order to capture different ways 
to refer to such forms of taxation in the German language).
 9 A combination of automatic and manual text cleaning methods were used to remove 
duplicate, corrected and very short articles. Further, internal memos (“Hausmitteilun-
gen”), letters from readers, tables of content, advertisement, book suggestions and event 
recommendations were excluded from the corpus.
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